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NOTES

Feb., 1959]

JUDGMENTS:

JURISDICTION TO IMPOSE ADDITIONAL CAUSES OF

ACTION UPON

NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANTS

From the rules governing the play of children, as evidenced by the plaintive
cry "That's not fair," to the rules which govern the highest court in our land,
fairness is the watchword of our actions. We guarantee to all "equal protection of
the laws"' and "due process of law." 2 Failure to observe these bulwarks of fair
play and reasonableness is the surest way to deny the justice basic to our system
of democratic government.
Occasionally, however, these great principles by which we guide ourselves and
our judicial system are overlooked and a decision is reached which does not conform to the traditional notions of fair play and justice. Thus, in the matter of
Everitt v. Everitt,3 though the majority of the Court of Appeals of New York
no doubt felt that their decision was fair, the two dissenting judges were
probably
4
correct in deciding that the defendant had been denied due process.
In that case an action was commenced against a non-resident of New York
state by personal service of summons and notice upon the defendant while she
was temporarily within the state. In New York an action is commenced by the
service of summons which may be served without a complaint 5 but, if desired, the
summons can be served with a notice as provided by rule 46 of the New York
Rules of Civil Practice:
If an action be brought for the breach of an express contract to pay absolutely, or on
a contingency, a sum or sums of money fixed by the terms of the contract, or capable
of being ascertained therefrom by computation only; or on an express or implied contract to pay money received or disbursed, or for the value of property delivered, or
for services rendered by, to or for the use of, the defendant or a third person; and the
complaint be not served with the summons, the plaintiff may serve with the summons
a notice stating the sum of money for which judgment will be taken in case of default.

The notice indicated a contract cause of action for $46,900. The defendant
appeared generally, demanding that a copy of the complaint be served on her
attorneys. 6 The complaint was served in due time containing not only the contract
cause of action as indicated by the notice served with the summons but also two
other causes of action not disclosed by the notice-one for $1,500 on another
contract, and the other for $300,000 for libel. When this complaint was served on
the defendant's attorney she was no longer within the state.
The defendant then moved to strike from the complaint the second and third
causes of action "on the ground that defendant is not a person subject to the jurisdiction of this Court as to said causes of action." 7 This motion was granted on
the ground that other causes could not be pleaded in addition to the cause of action
indicated in the notice if the defendant was no longer subject to the jurisdiction

I U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.

2U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.

3 4 N.Y.2d 13, 148 N.E.2d 891 (1958).
4
1d. at ......148 N.E.2d at 894 (dissenting opinion).
5
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 257: A copy of the complaint may be served with summons ....
(Emphasis added.)

6
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 257: ... If a copy of the complaint is not delivered ... at the
time of the delivery . . .of the summons .. . [defendant's] attorney . . . may serve . . .a

written demand for.., the complaint ....
7N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 237a: ... [A] defendant may make a special appearance solely to
object to the court's jurisdiction over his person.
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of the court at the time these additional causes were interposed.8 The appellate
division reversed 9 and was affirmed by the court of appeals. 10
The New York Court of Appeals in the Everitt case based its decision primarily on the theory that, after a complaint has been served, the notice attached to
the summons was no longer effectual. Sharp v. Clapp" is quoted as the authority
for the rule that:
... If the defendant appears, the notice at once is rendered of no importance. No
judgment can be taken against the defendant, then, until a complaint has been served
upon him, and his liability and rights are measured entirely by the allegations of the
complaint.

But, as stated by the dissent in the principal case, Sharp can have no bearing on
the matter. The defendant there was a resident of New York and subsequent complaints served upon him would be valid as he was continuously within the territorial limits of the state. The question of the defendant's non-residence did not2
arise in that case and such "cases

. .

. stand upon an entirely different footing."'1

This would appear to be a proper conclusion.
The court of appeals relied heavily on the point that the notice served with the
summons is limited to "stating the sum of money for which judgment will be taken
in case of default."' 13 They held that, except in case of default, the notice is not
equivalent to "a short ... complaint," 14 citing Seeley v. Greene15 where a default
judgment was rendered in excess of the relief requested in the notice served with
the summons. The court said in Seeley:'
Where a complaint is served, a default judgment must follow the complaint and the
relief therein demanded .... The notice served with a summons is in effect a short
forin of complaint .... It seems reasonable to require that the default judgment
entered upon notice must follow the notice. (Emphasis added.)

This language would seem to contradict the use of this authority in the Everitt
case. Several other New York cases' 7 have cited Seeley as authority for the proposition that a notice is a short form of complaint.
These are the procedural problems arising under New York practice. Of greater
import is the question of fair play under these rules.
It is generally and fundamentally agreed that the basis of jurisdiction over
individuals, at least in the common law countries, is territorial. Jurisdiction to
render a personal judgment or decree against a non-resident can be acquired only
by personal service of process on him within the territorial jurisdiction of the court
8
or by his voluntary appearance.'
May a court acquire jurisdiction over a non-resident for one purpose and,
8

157 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1956).

9 3 App. Div.2d 413, 161 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1957).

10 See note 3 supra.
11 1 5 App. Div. 445, 447, 44 N.Y.S. 451, 453 (1897).
12 4 N.Y.2d
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.

at ........ , 148 N.E.2d at 894.

15 139 Misc. 90, 247 N.Y.S. 679 (1931).
16 Id. at 92, 247 N.Y.S. at 681.
17 In the Matter of Crispino, 9 Misc.2d 409, 170 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1958) ; Thomas v. First
Nat'l Bank, 263 App. Div. 476, 33 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1942).
18 Mexican Central Ry. v. Pinkney, 149 U.S. 194 (1892) ; Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41
(1891) ; Maya Corp. v. Smith, 32 F.2d 350 (D. Del. 1929).
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when he appears to defend himself, substitute or add a different cause of action?
According to the weight of authority non-resident suitors are immune from service
of civil process while going to, attending, or returning from court.19 Thus it is not
possible to acquire further jurisdiction over a party coming into the state to defend
an action in which he is already subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
But how far can a court reasonably allow amendments to a complaint against
a non-resident who has already been subjected to the power of the court for a
limited purpose? 20The applicable principle is set forth in the Restatement of judgments as follows:

If a plaintiff brings an action against a defendant who is subject to the jurisdiction
of the court ...

by his general appearance in the action .. .the jurisdiction of the

court over him continues although the complaint is amended, where the effect of the
amendment is not to add or substitute a different cause of action from that stated in
the complaint.
The result is different, however, where by an amendment a different cause of action
is added to or substituted for the original cause of action, if when the amendment is
made the defendant is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the State .... ETlhe
judgment for the plaintiff on the new cause of action is void because of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him. The fact that the court has acquired jurisdiction over
the defendant with respect to the original cause of action does not give the court
jurisdiction over him as to other causes of action ....
The fact that by statute or otherwise a plaintiff is permitted to add or to substitute new causes of action by amendment is not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction
over the defendant as to such new causes of action if at the time of the amendment
the defendant is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the State. Such provisions are
applicable only where at the time of the amendment the State has jurisdiction over
the defendant ....(Emphasis added.)

This view has not as yet been explicitly approved by the United States Supreme Court 2' but it does purport to state a constitutional principle beyond the
reach of local law.2 2 Although contrary to the position taken by the Restatement
of Conflict of Laws,2 3 this view was expressly approved and followed by a state
court in Schuster v. Schuster24 and has support in several important United States
and state supreme court decisions 2 5
In Ex parte Indiana Transp. Co.2 the defendant had appeared in answer to
a libel in personam for the death of the plaintiff in a Chicago River steamship
disaster. Although the defendant was not subject to nor served with process within
19 Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222 (1932) ; Block v. Block, 91 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1949).
R sTAE=uT, JUOGMENTS § 5, comment g (1942).

20

21 Chapman v. Chapman, 284 App. Div. 504, 132 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1954).
22 RSTATE~mENT, JUDnGMENTS § 4, comment b (1942): "Where the state lacks jurisdiction,
the rendition of a judgment by a court of the State is not in accordance with due process of law
and is in violation of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. In the United States, therefore, the extent of the jurisdiction of a State is a federal question,
and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are controlling ....
"
2
3 RESTATEMENT, CONs'raCT OF LAWS § 82, comment d (1934): "When by the law of the
State in which actions are brought, an appearance is such as to subject him to the jurisdiction
of the court generally, jurisdiction attaches not only with respect to claims stated in the original
complaint but also to the claims by the same plaintiff stated in amendments to the complaint
if the law of the state where the action is brought so provides at the time of the appearance."
24 9 N.J. Super. 11, 74 A.2d 420 (1950).
25 In the Matter of Indiana Transp. Co., 244 U.S. 456 (1916) ; Maya Corp. v. Smith,
32 F.2d 350 (D. Del. 1929); Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bank of Plymouth, 213 Iowa
1058, 237 N.W. 234 (1931); Hay v. Tuttle, 67 Minn. 56, 69 N.W. 696 (1896).
26 244 U.S. 456 (1916).
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that federal district, the district court granted leave to intervene to 373 other libellants, each charging a separate cause of action for death in the same accident. It
was argued that the district court had jurisdiction with respect to the additional
libellants by reason of the defendant's appearance in the first action. This reason27
ing was rejected by the United States Supreme Court which stated:
... [Alppearance in answer to a citation does not bring a defendant under the general physical power of the court . . . . Conventional effect is given to a decree after
an appearance because when power once has been manifested it is to the advantage
of all not to insist upon its being maintained to the end. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry,
228 U.S. 346, 353 . . . . That, however, is the limit of the court's authority. Not
having any power in fact over the defendant unless it can seize him again, it cannot
introduce new claims of new claimants into an existing suit simply because the defendant has appeared in that suit ....
(Emphasis added.)

In the case of Maya Corporationv. Smith2 8 the defendants appeared specially
in answer to the plaintiff's complaint for the alleged purpose of enforcing a lien
upon shares of the plaintiff corporation held by the defendants. The defendants
were not residents of the federal district in which the action was brought but were
compelled to appear for this action pursuant to section 57 of the Judicial Code.2 9
After the trial had begun the plaintiff moved for leave to amend its complaint to
include an action cognizable under sections 24 and 51 of the Judicial Code3 0 in
which the defendants would not have been compelled initially to appear in the
district court. The federal district court granted the defendants' motion to withdraw their appearances stating:3 1
I think the law is and should be that the enforced appearance of non-residents for
one purpose should not be used for a broader and different purpose . . . and that a
non-resident defendant must be permitted to withdraw his appearance, if, by an
amendment allowed, the plaintiff presents an entirely new or radically different cause
of action ....

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Hay v. Tuttle,32 reversed a judgment for
a plaintiff who had brought an action against a non-resident. The complaint was
ostensibly for conversion of stock and the plaintiff had attached the defendant's
property in the state in order to compel the defendant to appear specially for the
purpose of protecting his property against the attachment. The plaintiff was not
permitted to amend his complaint to include an in personam action to set aside
33
the transfer of such stock, the court saying:
ITlhe majority of the court are of the opinion that, defendant having been comr..
pelled to appear in order to protect his property from attachment in an action ostensibly for conversion, it would be a constructive fraud upon him, amounting to a breach
of comity, to allow the plaintiff to change front, and avail himself of the defendant's
appearance, for the purposes of an action to set aside the transfer of the stock, and
for its return, in which the courts of this state could never obtain jurisdiction of the
defendant's person except by his voluntary appearance; that courts should be very
careful to prevent the enforced appearance of a non-resident on one purpose being
used for some other and ulterior purpose. (Emphasis added.)
2

7 Id. at 457, 458.
28 32 F.2d 350 (D. Del. 1929).
2962 Stat. 888 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 118 (1952).
3062 Stat. 870, 885 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 112 (1952).
3132 F.2d at 353.
32 67 Minn. 56, 69 N.W. 696 (1896).
33 Id. at 59, 69 N.W. at 697.
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It will be noted that in both Maya Corp. v. Smith and Hay v. Tuttle the court
speaks in terms of the non-resident defendant being compelled to appear. The
compulsion in the Maya case was statutory but whatever "compulsion" there was
in the Hay case was only that imposed by the defendant upon himself, motivated
by his desire to defend his property and prevent its forfeiture by way of a default
judgment. This compulsion is no greater than that practiced upon the defendant
in the principal case; a failure to appear in answer to the summons would result
in a default judgment being taken against the defendant.
No attempt is made in the Restatement of Judgments to reconcile the view
there expressed with the Restatement of Conflict of Laws but it does appear that
the position of the Restatement of Judgments is supported by competent and well
reasoned authority based upon principles of "fair play and substantial justice"
to the non-resident defendant
which are embodied in the constitutional require34
ments of due process.
A further problem arises under the New York Civil Practice Act in that a
complaint need not be served with the summons. 35 It is true that when a notice is
served with the summons a default judgment can be given for the sum of money
stated in the notice. 36 If it is true, as the New York Court seems to have erroneously concluded, that when the defendant appears the notice has no effect, how
far can the complaint go in alleging other causes of action not stated in the notice?
Does the fact that summons was served without notice or complaint, or that only
a notice accompanied the summons and the defendant made an appearance, mean
that any and every charge against the defendant would be permitted? If this were
true, no complaint or notice would ever be served with a summons upon a nonresident defendant temporarily present within the state. Why would a plaintiff
ever limit himself to what was stated in the complaint when another, completely
different cause of action might arise against the defendant of which plaintiff might
wish to avail himself in a later complaint? A purposeful service of summons without complaint would in effect "hold the door open" to further causes of action,
a procedure barred by the jurisdictional requirements of the Restatement of
37
Judgments.
As stated in the dissent to the principal case:38
Her [defendant's] willingness to appear in the action of which she had notice was
not tantamount to consent to appear in every conceivable action that the plaintiff
might substitute or add. To hold otherwise would be to deny the defendant due
process ....

To deny this statement is to deny what we constantly seek to impose upon our
administration of justice: fair play and reasonableness.
An analogy between summons with notice and summons with complaint may
be made. A non-resident defendant appearing in answer to a summons served with
a complaint will not be subject to additional complaints. Consequently a nonresident defendant appearing in answer to a summons served with notice should
not be subject to added complaints. The non-resident defendant who does not
appear in answer to a summons served with complaint will be subject to a default
34 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
M N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. AcT § 257.
36 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 486.
37
Section 5, comment g.
88 4 N.Y.2d at.......
148 N.E.2d at 894.

